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FROM HOUSEHOLD BATHROOMS
TO THE WORKPLACE: BRINGING
THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
BACK TO WHERE IT BELONGS:
AN ANALYSIS OF TOYOTA MOTOR
MANUFACTURING V. WILLIAMS
Argun M. Ulgen*
INTRODUCTION
Ella Williams has endured the following impairments over the
past ten years: bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome,1 myotendinitis and
myositis bilateral, and thoracic outlet compression.2 Williams's
carpal tunnel syndrome could lead to muscle atrophy and extreme
sensory deficits.' Her other conditions are equally unpleasant: my-
otendinitis bilateral perscapular is an inflammation of the muscles
and tendons around both shoulder blades;4 myotendinitis and my-
ositis bilateral affects the forearms by causing median nerve irrita-
tion,5 and thoracic outlet compression is characterized by pain in
the nerve leading to the upper extremities.6 As a result of these
* J.D. candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2003; B.A., Government,
Cornell University, 2000. I would like to thank the Editors and Staff of the Fordham
Urban Law Journal for the time and dedication they put into editing this Comment.
Special thanks goes to Professor Sheila Foster, who helped me sort out my ideas until
we both realized a strong and consistent theme for this work. Gail Glidewell, Alex
Sauchik, and Kim Smith were instrumental in editing this Comment. I dedicate this
work to my parents, Togay and Zinnur Ulgen, and my closest friends. Without their
sacrifice, commitment, and laughter everything that I have accomplished would not
be as meaningful. I also dedicate this Comment to Ella Williams, who has demon-
strated an amazing amount of courage and resilience over the past decade. I hope
that this Comment encourages people to learn more about the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act, a fascinating and important piece of legislation.
1. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002). Bilateral carpal tun-
nel syndrome has symptoms that vary widely from person to person. Id. at 199. Se-
vere cases are characterized by muscle atrophy, and twenty-two percent of cases have
symptoms that last eight years or longer. Id. In Williams's case, her carpal tunnel
syndrome began in the early 1990s and has grown increasingly severe ever since. Id.
at 187-90.
2. Id. at 189.
3. See id. at 199 (stating that severe cases of carpal tunnel syndrome can include
these symptoms).
4. Id. at 189.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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afflictions, Williams needs help getting dressed.7 She cannot drive
long distances with her family.8 She cannot garden as much as she
would like, has quit dancing, and must limit her participation in
other recreational activities. 9 She cannot sweep the floors of her
home."' Most importantly, Williams must limit the time she spends
playing with her children.1
Although Ella Williams's impairments resulted in several
changes in her lifestyle, she still wanted to be a productive citizen
in the workforce.12 Williams's employer, Toyota Motor Manufac-
turing, made a small adjustment to her work schedule, and as-
signed Williams to tasks that did not require any activity that could
worsen her impairments. 3 While she was not able to frequently
lift objects weighing ten pounds or more, constantly extend her
wrists or elbows, maintain her arms above her shoulders for ex-
tended periods of time, or use vibratory tools, she proved valuable
in other jobs within the workplace.' 4 For three years, Williams was
assigned to the assembly line to scan products for flaws.' 5
Throughout that time, her employer said her performance was
satisfactory.' 6
In 1996, however, Toyota Motor Manufacturing revamped its
policies to require those who worked in Williams's division to do
certain physical tasks.' 7 Those tasks worsened Williams's impair-
ments.18 Williams took several days off from work due to severe
pain.19 Eventually, according to Williams, she was fired because of
her inability to perform these tasks.2 ° In response, she sued Toyota
7. Id. at 202.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See id. at 188-89 (stating that Williams wanted to work in Quality Control
Inspection Operations performing visual inspections that required few or no manual
tasks after she was diagnosed); cf. Eric Wade Richardson, Comment, Who is a Quali-
fied Individual With a Disability Under The Americans with Disabilities Act, 64 U.
CIN. L. REV. 189, 189 (1995) (noting that at the time when the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act was passed, between sixty and seventy percent of the disabled population
in the United States indicated a desire for full-time work).
13. Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 188-89.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 189.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 189-90.
20. Id.
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Motor Manufacturing for discrimination under the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA" or "Act").21
Under the ADA, Toyota Motor Manufacturing is required to
provide Williams with "reasonable accommodations '22 for her
"known physical or mental limitations, 23 if Williams is "an other
wise qualified individual with a disability,"24 provided that the ac-
commodation does not pose an "undue hardship" on the
business. 25 In Toyota Motor Manufacturing v. Williams, 26 the Su-
preme Court had to decide whether Williams was disabled under
the ADA as a matter of law.27 Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote
the opinion for a unanimous Court, holding that she was not. 28 The
effect of this decision is that Williams, a seven-year Toyota em-
ployee, may lose her job permanently. The severe combination of
impairments she has incurred has not been interpreted as a disabil-
ity under the ADA. Justice O'Connor's "strict" interpretation 29 of
the ADA may bar many employees with impairments similar to
Williams who request reasonable workplace accommodation from
pursuing lawsuits under the ADA because they do not fit within
the ADA definition of being disabled.3
In deciding that Williams was not disabled under the ADA, Jus-
tice O'Connor was most concerned with deferring to the "legisla-
tive findings and purposes that motivate the Act."31 Recognizing
that Congress cited forty-three million people as being disabled,32
Justice O'Connor justified her strict interpretation of the ADA as
follows: "If Congress intended everyone with a physical impair-
ment that precluded the performance of some isolated, unimpor-
21. Id. at 190. The Court unanimously held that Williams was not disabled under
Title 1 of the ADA as a matter of law. This Comment will concentrate specifically on
the meaning of the term "disability" under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (1995), and the
Court's application of that section in Toyota Motor Manufacturing.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 187.
27. Id. (stating that certiorari was granted to decide the proper standard for as-
sessing whether an individual is substantially limited in performing a manual task).
28. Id. at 202-03.
29. See id. at 197 (stating that the terms of the ADA need "to be interpreted
strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled.").
30. Based on the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") regula-
tions, the plaintiff in an ADA claim has the burden of proving that she is disabled as a
matter of law. If she cannot prove that she is disabled, the court will grant the defen-
dant summary judgment under 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (2001).
31. Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 197.
32. Id. at 197-98.
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tant, or particularly difficult manual task to qualify as disabled, the
number of disabled Americans would surely have been much
higher. '33 On its face, this argument seems plausible. An analysis
of the economic remedial goals that Congress sought to achieve
with the ADA, however, illustrates that Congress intended to allow
thousands of people like Ella Williams to overcome "stereotypic
assumptions not truly indicative of individual ability" 34 and con-
tribute to the economy by attaining "economic self-sufficiency. '35
The purpose of this Comment is two-fold. First, it will analyze
how the Supreme Court's treatment of the ADA in Toyota Motor
Manufacturing deviated from the economic goals that Congress
targeted when it passed the ADA, and argue that plaintiffs such as
Ella Williams are exactly whom Congress had in mind when enact-
ing the ADA. In accordance with Congress's intent under Title I of
the ADA, "to provide clear, strong, consistent, and enforceable
standards addressing discrimination against individuals,"36 this
Comment then attempts to establish a clearer, more formal defini-
tion of disability, centered on Congress's remedial economic pur-
poses in enacting the ADA.
Part I of this Comment will discuss the background of the ADA,
concentrating on the Act's economic goals and their relation to the
intended interpretation of the term "disability." Part II discusses
in detail the Supreme Court's decision in Toyota Motor Manufac-
turing, contrasting the congressional intent behind the ADA with
its recent flawed interpretation by the Court. Finally, Part III at-
tempts to create a clearer test to guide courts in interpreting the
term "disability" to conform to Congress's intent.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE ADA
A. General Statutory Provisions of the ADA
In Toyota Motor Manufacturing, the Court analyzed the defini-
tion of the term "disability" under the ADA.37 The ADA defines
disability as an impairment that substantially limits a major life ac-
tivity.38 If an ADA plaintiff proves that she is disabled, she must
33. Id. at 197.
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1995). One of the central tenets behind the ADA
was that disabled individuals were qualified to work and that stereotypes indicating
otherwise needed to be eliminated. See infra notes 42-69 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the legislative history of the ADA).
35. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8).
36. See id. § 12101(b)(2).
37. Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 193.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
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then show that she would still be qualified for the job in question.
The ADA defines a "qualified individual with a disability" as "an
individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accom-
modation, can perform essential functions of the employment posi-
tion that such individual holds or desires. '39  Once an ADA
plaintiff establishes that she is a "qualified disabled" individual,40 it
must be shown that a reasonable accommodation can be estab-
lished by the employer, without an undue hardship on the
business.41
B. Economic Circumstances That Led to the Passage
of the ADA
A primary purpose of the ADA was to create more full-time em-
ployment opportunities for the disabled.42 Numerous studies
throughout the mid-to-late 1980s indicated that of all the "discrete
and insular '""3 minorities, disabled individuals44 were by far the
most economically disadvantaged.45 About two-thirds of working-
age individuals with disabilities are not working, a number that ex-
ceeded that of all other demographic groups under age sixty-five of
39. Id. § 12111(8).
40. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements that
a plaintiff must be "disabled" and "qualified" under the ADA).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)-(10) (discussing the terms "reasonable accommodation"
and "undue hardship," which measure the economic consequences that an employer
will have to suffer if it accommodates a disabled employee. These modifications in-
clude "job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a va-
cant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices . . . [and] other
similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities." Id. § 12111(9)).
42. See S. REP. No. 101-116, at 17-18 (1989).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7).
44. The various studies presented in this Section have different definitions for the
term "disabled." For instance, under the "health conditions approach," which looks
at all conditions that impair the health of an individual, 160 million people are dis-
abled. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 485 (1999). Under a "work
disability approach," which focuses strictly on an individual's reported ability to work,
only 22.7 million people are disabled. See id. What these studies have in common,
however, is that they concentrate specifically on the economic implications of discrim-
ination against disabled individuals, and the importance of legislation to remedy these
problems.
45. Louis HARRIS & Assoc., THE ICD SURVEY OF DISABLED AMERICANS:
BRINGING DISABLED AMERICANS INTO THE MAINSTREAM 23 (1986) [hereinafter ICD
SURVEY]. For purposes of the survey, a person was considered disabled if: (1) she had
a disability or health problem that prevented her from participating fully in work,
school, or other activities; (2) she claimed to have a physical disability, a seeing, hear-
ing, or speech impairment, an emotional or mental disability, or a learning disability;
or (3) considered herself disabled or said others would consider her disabled. Id. at
iii.
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any significant size, including young African-Americans, a group
often singled out as having an extremely high unemployment
rate.46 The number of underemployed disabled people was even
higher.47 There was no concrete business reason, however, as to
why so many disabled people were either unemployed or underem-
ployed-with over two-thirds of all disabled people interviewed ex-
pressing a desire to become full-time employees. 48 Further,
disabled individuals employed full-time maintained above-average
work attendance and productivity.49 Studies also indicated that
employer fears about expensive insurance premiums or modifica-
tions to the worksite have proven unfounded.5 0 These facts led to
the conclusion that discrimination was the primary reason for the
exclusion of disabled individuals from the workplace. 1
The extraordinarily high number of unemployed disabled indi-
viduals leads to unfortunate results. The National Council on the
Handicapped noted that twenty percent of working-age people
with disabilities lived in poverty as of 1988.52 Further, during this
period, approximately half the people with disabilities were living
in households having an annual income of $15,000 or less-double
the percentage of people without disabilities who had such low
incomes.53
Studies also reflected that although disabled individuals were
willing to find work, the type of work available was limited because
forty percent of disabled people have not finished high school, 54
and an even smaller percentage of these individuals completed col-
lege. As a result, many disabled people took jobs in unskilled
labor fields, typically jobs involving physical tasks that, without
46. See id. at 23-24.
47. Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the Employment Provisions of the
Americans with Disabilities Act: Workplace Accommodations, in EMPLOYMENT, DISA-
BILITY, AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 222 (Peter David Blanck ed.,
2000).
48. Richardson, supra note 12, at 189.
49. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, at 37 (1990).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. NAT'L COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, ON THE THRESHOLD OF INDEPEN-
DENCE: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED
STATES 11-18 (1988).
53. Id. at 23-24.
54. Id. at 23 (indicating that this number is much higher than the fifteen percent of
non-disabled Americans who did not graduate from high school).
55. Id. (indicating that only twenty-nine percent of individuals with disabilities had
gone to college in 1988, when the survey was compiled).
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reasonable and cost-effective accommodations, were not available
to "otherwise qualified" individuals.56
By 1990, the high level of unemployment and poverty among dis-
abled individuals contributed to high levels of federal government
spending on social welfare programs. Congressional research on
the effect of disability discrimination on government spending gen-
erally concluded "discrimination results in dependency on social
welfare programs that cost the taxpayers unnecessary billions of
dollars each year. '57 Sandy Parrino, the chairwoman of the Na-
tional Council on Disability, testified that discrimination places
people with disabilities in "chains," making such dependency "a
major and totally unnecessary contributor to public deficits and
private expenditures."' 58 Further, President George H. W. Bush
stated:
On the cost side, the National Council on the Handicapped
states that current ... spending on disability benefits and pro-
grams exceeds $60 billion annually. Excluding the millions of
disabled who want to work from the employment ranks costs
society literally billions of dollars annually in support payments
and lost income tax revenues.59
A central goal behind the ADA was to increase the supply of
qualified workers. President Bush summarized the argument as
follows: "The United States is now beginning to face labor
shortages as the baby boomers move through the work force. The
disabled offer a pool of talented workers whom we simply cannot
afford to ignore, especially in connection with the high tech growth
industries in the future. 6 °
More importantly, Senate committees noted that the number of
disabled individuals in this country should not be interpreted
strictly, recognizing that the number of disabled individuals in the
United States is not static. Justin Dart, a leading figure in the
56. For instance, "the total losses in earnings for men with musculoskeletal impair-
ments is $11.5 billion which represents forty-three percent of the total $26.5 billion in
annual earnings losses attributed to wage and employment discrimination against all
men with disabilities." Marjorie L. Baldwin, Estimating the Potential Benefits of the
ADA on the Wages and Employment of Persons with Disabilities, in EMPLOYMENT,
DISABILITY, AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES AcT, supra note 47, at 274 (in-
dicating that any disabled individual who had a physical impairment and a lack of a
high school or college education (or both), had a small chance of finding full-time
employment).
57. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, at 43 (1990).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 44.
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American disability rights movement, noted the direct relationship
between spending and the number of disabled individuals in the
United States. According to Dart, discrimination is "driving us in-
evitably towards an economic and moral disaster of giant, paternal-
istic welfare bureaucracies. We [are] already paying unaffordable
and rapidly escalating billions in public and private funds to main-
tain ever-increasing millions of potentially productive Americans
in unjust, unwanted dependency. 66 1
Congress noted that keeping people with disabilities from the
workforce would effectively remove a "full range of... talents and
abilities" from contributing further to society.62 Congress acknowl-
edged that disabled individuals who were qualified to work had
both tangible and intangible qualities to add to the competitiveness
of the economy.63 Businessman Robert Mosbacher Jr., president
of the Mosbacher Energy Company and chairman of the Greater
Houston Partnership's Education and Workforce Advisory Com-
mittee, stated:
From the perspective of a private sector employer, this legisla-
tion is also extremely important. If we are to remain competi-
tive as a nation in the international marketplace, we must have a
well trained, well educated and highly motivated workforce...
What is more, they [disabled individuals] are some of the most
highly motivated people in our society today.64
In light of these findings, it became clear that § 504 of the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973, which prohibits discrimination on the basis
of disability in all programs or activities administered by recipients
of federal financial assistance,65 was not a proper mechanism for
integrating disabled individuals into the workplace. One of the key
purposes of the ADA was to expand the scope of the Rehabilita-
tion Act to include private businesses not receiving federal funds.66
The Rehabilitation Act had interpretation problems that the
ADA sought to correct. One of the biggest problems with the Act
was its omission of definitive interpretive guidelines, leading to er-
ratic judicial interpretations.67 The result was that such matters as
61. Id.
62. Id. at 45.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (2002).
66. See Coleman v. Zatecha, 824 F. Supp. 1360, 1367 (D. Neb. 1993) (stating that
the ADA is not limited to programs that receive federal funds).
67. See, e.g., Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., The Americans With Disabilities Act: Analysis
and Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
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reasonable accommodations and discriminatory qualification stan-
dards never really developed into agreed-upon judicial tests for the
courts.68 As a result, in 1990, the ADA was passed by a vote of 377
to twenty-eight in the House of Representatives and a ninety-one
to six vote in the Senate.69
C. Analysis of the ADA: Purpose and Economic Implications
1. The ADA Text Related to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
In passing the ADA, Congress built upon the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 in several ways. First, it intended to borrow as much of the
flexibility of the 1973 Act as it could. The Senate noted that much
of the substantive framework of the Rehabilitation Act should be
borrowed by the ADA.7 ° More importantly, emphasizing how
comprehensive it wanted the ADA to be, the Senate specifically
praised the flexible nature of the reasonable accommodation and
undue hardship standards of the Rehabilitation Act, and suggested
that the ADA should adapt that flexibility directly from the older
statute. 71 An elastic interpretation of these standards would ease
the burden on already qualified disabled individuals of proving that
their employment was cost-justified. This interpretation is consis-
tent with Congress's goal of altering the workplace to integrate
qualified disabled individuals.72
In addition, Congress intended to fix the Rehabilitation Act's
more troublesome nebulousness by ensuring the passage of a
"clear and comprehensive national mandate, '73 that would "pro-
vide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing dis-
crimination against individuals with disabilities. ' 74  It may be
inferred that Congress explicitly stated these goals in order to elim-
inate the inconsistent judicial interpretations of § 504 of the Reha-
bilitation Act. In order to establish these standards, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") issued regula-
tions interpreting each provision of the Act.75
REV. 413, 431 (1991) (discussing the Rehabilitation Act's potential for erratic inter-
pretation in more detail).
68. Id. at 431 n.96.
69. Id. at 433-34.
70. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 26, 31 (1989).
71. Id. at 32.
72. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, at 43-45 (1990).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2002).
74. Id. § 12101(b)(2).
75. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (2001).
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Further, the ADA was designed to expound upon the Rehabili-
tation Act primarily by increasing the scope of statutory protection
afforded disabled individuals.7 6 One congressional finding con-
cerning the ADA was that "some 43,000,000 Americans have one
or more physical or mental disabilities, and this number is increas-
ing as the population as a whole is growing older."" Because Con-
gress took this number from data collected by the National Council
on the Handicapped,78 it is important to note that the research dis-
cusses the variations in estimates based on different definitions of
the term "disability" and the difficulty in arriving at a single, relia-
ble overall number of individuals with disabilities. Adding to the
murky nature of this statistic is the fact that the Congressional Re-
search Service report was not presented "as a number of persons
with disabilities but as a figure representing the number of persons
with impairments or chronic conditions. ' 79 The use of the disjunc-
tive "or" in the report makes the number of disabled individuals in
the United States even less clear.
In addition, Congress was careful not to provide a list of covered
conditions in the ADA "because of the difficulty of insuring the
comprehensiveness of such a list, particularly in light of the fact
that new disorders may develop in the future."80 This statement by
the Senate Committee cautions against relying too heavily on the
forty-three million figure when defining a disability under the
ADA. Congress explicitly noted that problems could arise in asso-
ciating a particular number of disabled people with the ADA and
acknowledged that the definition of "disability" is complicated and
may change.
By recognizing that the number of disabled people is increasing,
Congress used the forty-three million figure as a benchmark from
which to make the more important point that, as a result of the
growth of the number of disabled people in the United States, the
substantial amount of private and public funds spent on disability
welfare would continue to grow as well. In noting the increasing
population of disabled individuals in the United States, Congress
was specifically referring to the "baby boom" generation and the
76. Burgdorf, supra note 67, at 431. The Rehabilitation Act only covered employ-
ers that received federal grants.
77. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1).
78. See Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., Disability Discrimination in Employment Law 48
(1995).
79. Id.
80. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22 (1989).
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correlation of increasing disabilities and age.8' In fact, most of the
congressional reports concerning the number of disabled individu-
als in the United States centered around the growing number of
disabled individuals and their disproportionate number in the
workplace-not on setting a specific number of disabled individu-
als to be used in judicial interpretation.8 2 This leads to the infer-
ence that the ADA's primary concern was to open the workplace
to disabled individuals, and that Congress did not want to concen-
trate on setting a strict limit on who was disabled under the Act
because such a limit would negate the ADA's economic purpose.
2. The Economic Cost-Benefit Analysis Underlying Congress's
Passage of the ADA
The ADA is regarded as a unique civil rights act because, unlike
acts that protect other classes from discrimination, a qualified dis-
abled individual under the ADA may require her employer to
spend money for a "reasonable accommodation" so the employee
may maintain her employment at the workplace.83 Employers are
consistently encouraging courts to take a narrow interpretation of
the term disability in deciding who will qualify under the ADA.
Studies have shown, however, that in several cases, the cost of a
reasonable accommodation is far less than the overall positive eco-
nomic effects of maintaining a less-strict and consistent standard of
interpretation of the number of qualified disabled individuals
under the ADA.84
The positive economic impact of the ADA is widespread. Every
time the ADA is invoked, "Assistant technology ["AT"] inventors
and producers enjoy increased profits because of demand in the
highly diversified and rapidly expanding AT market. ' 85 This is es-
pecially true because a great deal of AT technology is inexpen-
sive.86 Further, taxpayers benefit when capable workers are taken
off the welfare rolls.87
81. BURGDORF, supra note 78, at 48.
82. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, at 43-46 (1990). It is important to note that all of the
statements cited in this hearing concentrated on the economic and social remedial
effects of the ADA.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2002).
84. See, e.g., Heidi M. Bervin & Peter David Blanck, Assistive Technology and the
Workplace, in EMPLOYMENT, DISABILITY, AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
AcT, supra note 47, at 343-44.
85. Id. at 343.
86. Id. at 344.
87. Id. at 343.
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Employers, in general, benefit by drawing on a largely untapped
productive workforce.88 Under the ADA, the value of a disabled
worker's productivity should equal or exceed the worker's wage in
a given labor market.89 Therefore, the employer suffers no loss in
worker ability by hiring a disabled individual, but may enjoy an
economic gain. Employers will not have to pay increased social
welfare taxes to support disability welfare. Employers will take
comfort in the fact that disabled individuals generally make above-
average attendance efforts,9° and have above-average motivation 91
and employee evaluations 92 than do non-disabled workers. Finally,
the low direct costs of accommodations for employees with disabil-
ities have been shown to produce substantial economic benefits
overall, including injury prevention, reduced workers' compensa-
tion costs, and better workplace effectiveness and efficiency.93
The costs to an employer and the economy by less stringently
interpreting the term "disability" under the ADA are miniscule
compared to the potential economic gains. Scholars note that
there is a gross misconception by employers that the establishment
of AT for disabled workers would cut into profits.94 Quite to the
contrary, the findings of one study suggest that AT is typically low-
tech, inexpensive, and can represent capital improvements from
which all may benefit.95 A study conducted by Sears, Roebuck and
Co. from 1978 to 1997 found:
[N]early all of five hundred accommodations sampled at Sears
required little or no cost. Effective accommodations included
improved physical access (such as closer parking spaces),
changed schedules, assistance by others, and changed job duties.
During the years 1990 to 1997, the average direct cost for ac-
commodations was less than $45 per person.96
It has also been shown that the small AT cost has enabled quali-
fied employees with disabilities to perform essential job func-
tions.97 Therefore, when an employer spends money on a
reasonable accommodation under the ADA, the action is cost-jus-
88. Id.
89. See id. at 343-46.
90. Blanck, supra note 47, at 215-18.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Bervin & Blanck, supra note 84, at 345-47.
94. See id. at 343.
95. Id. at 345.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 346.
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tified. The employer receives a return on the investment made in
accommodating the disabled employee. While this cost-benefit
analysis has been criticized in other areas of the law for not being
well-suited to measure social policy effects, particularly those relat-
ing to quality of life factors, such a criticism fails when using this
analytical method under the ADA. Dart, in his Congressional tes-
timony, noted that the small cost to the employer to provide dis-
abled individuals with opportunities were clearly less than the costs
that a capable, yet unemployed, disabled individual endures. Dart
said:
We can go just so long constantly reaching dead ends. I am
broke, degraded, and angry, have attempted suicide three times.
I know hundreds. Most of us try, but which way and where can
we go? What and who can we be? If I were understood, I
would have something to live for.98
Thus, based on the legislative history and a cost-benefit analysis
of the ADA, it may be concluded that the term "disability" was not
to be narrowly interpreted. Rather, the Act's main purpose was to
find qualified individuals with impairments and to introduce their
capability and skill into the marketplace. Further, because the
ADA would force employers to make accommodations, albeit rea-
sonably, it was important for the EEOC to promulgate clear and
comprehensive standards that would allow employers to identify
which employees were disabled under the Act.99
D. The EEOC Regulations: How They Conform to
Congress's Economic Intent
In accordance with Congress's economic goals, the EEOC
promulgated a set of clear, comprehensive, and consistent stan-
dards to define the term "disability" under the ADA. 10 Providing
interpretive guidelines in accordance with Congress's intent would
facilitate inclusion of a broad range of impaired individuals into the
workforce while preventing prohibitive costs to employers. The
EEOC established a two-pronged test to determine whether an in-
dividual is disabled under the ADA.101 To qualify as disabled under
this test:
98. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, at 43 (1990).
99. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2) (2002).
100. Id.
101. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1) (2001).
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1. The individual must have a physical or mental
impairment;
1 °2
2. The impairment must substantially limit the person in per-
forming one or more major life activities.1"3
An analysis of these standards and, again, the underlying legisla-
tive intent, show that Congress did not intend for the term "disabil-
ity" to be interpreted narrowly.
First, to qualify as disabled, the individual must have an actual
impairment.1 0 4 The EEOC defines a physical impairment as "any
physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or an-
atomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems:
neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (in-
cluding speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive,
genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine."1 °5 In
accord with congressional reports, this regulatory definition is not
an exhaustive list of specific impairment categories covered by the
ADA." 6 Just as the number forty-three million was used only as a
benchmark, this list provides a non-exhaustive digest of better-
known physical impairments. The fact that the EEOC regulations
implementing the ADA decline to make an all-inclusive laundry
list of impairments that constitute disabilities further supports the
strong inference that Congress's intent behind the ADA was to
take a loose interpretive stance on the definition of a "disability"
and to make the ADA as "comprehensive" as possible, in accord
with legitimate economic concerns.107
Further, the impairment must substantially limit the individual in
performing one or more major life activities.10 8 To further under-
stand the terms "substantially limits" and "major life activity," the
second prong of the test needs to be broken down into its compo-
nent parts. According to the EEOC, the term "substantially lim-
its" means "unable to perform a major life activity that the average
person in the general population can perform."'0 9 More precisely,
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. § 1630.2(h).
105. Id.
106. See EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 902.2(b)(2)) (2001) [hereinafter EEOC
COMPLIANCE MANUAL], available at http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/902cm.html (last vis-
ited Jan. 15, 2003).
107. For a discussion of Congress's goals when passing the ADA, see supra notes
57-64 and accompanying text.
108. For a discussion of cost-benefit analysis of the ADA, see supra notes 90-107
and accompanying text.
109. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2j)(1)(i).
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the term may be interpreted as "significantly restricted as to the
condition, manner or duration under which an individual can per-
form a particular major life activity as compared to the condition,
manner, or duration under which the average person in the general
population can perform the same major life activity." 110
The language "substantially limits" was selected to determine
whether a particular individual's condition is too minor to consti-
tute a disability.111 It is designed to eliminate "temporary impair-
ments of short duration. '112 The EEOC cites "broken limbs,
sprained joints, concussions, appendicitis, influenza ... [and] com-
mon colds" as examples of impairments that are not "substantially
limiting. 1" 3 All of the examples of non-substantial impairments
contained in the EEOC are temporary or merely trivial in nature.
The term "substantially limits" acts as a barrier to frivolous law-
suits and eliminates unnecessary administrative and transaction
costs, while still maintaining the broad and comprehensive reach of
the ADA for qualified individuals with disabilities.
The EEOC defines "major life activities" to mean "functions
such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, see-
ing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." ' a The
EEOC did not intend for this list of major life activities to be ex-
haustive. It provided an even broader definition of "major life ac-
tivity" that includes basic activities that the average person in the
general population can perform with little or no difficulty, such as
sitting and standing.115
The inclusion of major life activity as a part of the ADA's two-
pronged test has sparked debate.1 1 6 Such a limit was not included
in either the original ADA bill proposed by the National Council
on Disability, or in the ADA bills discussed in previous Congres-
sional debate. 17 In addition to more extensive Congressional dis-
cussion of the term "substantially limits," this history may imply
that Congress was more interested in the durational and progres-
sive severity of one's impairment rather than the impairment's re-
lation to various major societal life activities.
110. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 106, § 902.4(b)(1)(ii).
111. S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23-24 (1989).
112. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 106, § 902.4(b).
113. Id. § 902.4(d).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See Burgdorf, supra note 67, at 449.
117. Id. at 448.
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Assuming that Congress intended the term "major life activity"
to be included as part of the two-pronged test, the rationale for this
limitation was to clarify that disability does not include "minor,
trivial impairments," such as a simple infected finger., In its anal-
ysis of major life activity, Congress also noted that disabilities
should not be limited to severe or permanent conditions. 119 There-
fore, just as with the "substantially limit" term, it may be inferred
that Congress included major life activities as a means to eliminate
frivolous or weak ADA claims. The phrase was not established to
bring about a strict interpretation of the term "disability" under
the ADA.
Based on the definitional nature of "substantially limits" and
"major life activity," the combination of these terms indicates that
a plaintiff must prove that she is either unable or severely re-
stricted from doing a basic activity that an average person can per-
form with little or no difficulty. 120 The test should be applied on an
ad hoc basis-the issue being whether the impairment substantially
limits the major life activities of the person in question, not
whether the impairment is substantially limiting in general. The
test may take one of two forms, depending on which major life
activity a plaintiff claims is affected.
The first form involves major life activities specifically men-
tioned by the EEOC, such as walking, seeing, hearing, standing,
lifting, or manual tasks. The EEOC did not intend for these terms
to be interpreted broadly, stating, "there has been little dispute
about what is meant by such terms as 'breathing,' 'walking,' 'hear-
ing,' or 'seeing."' 121 For instance, in reference to walking, the
EEOC stated, "if an individual's arthritis makes it unusually diffi-
cult (as compared to most people or to the average person in the
general population) to walk, then the individual is substantially
limited in the ability to walk." '122 Neither the EEOC nor Congress
questions whether the impaired individual may walk slowly, but
not fast, nor one mile, but not two. Here, as with other specific
major life activities, the emphasis is more on the duration and se-
118. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, at 52 (1990); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989).
119. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Handicap in Programs and Activities Re-
ceiving or Benefiting from Federal Financial Assistance, 29 C.F.R. § 32.3(b)(3) (Oct.
1, 2002).
120. See id. § 32.3(b)(2)-(3).
121. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 106, § 902.4(c).
122. Id.
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verity of the individual's disability, than on the range of given ma-
jor life activities that can be accomplished.123
The second form of the test that the EEOC established concerns
"working," a term that by its very nature is open to broad interpre-
tation.124 Because the EEOC hoped to avoid dispute over the term
"major life activity,"' 25 it stated that when an ADA plaintiff shows
that another major life activity may be substantially limited by her
impairment, "one need not determine whether the impairment
substantially limits the person's ability to work. 12
6
The EEOC guidelines, used to determine whether the impair-
ment substantially limits an individual's ability to work, have been
set to provide courts with clear and consistent standards to use in
considering each individual's qualifications. According to the test:
The term substantially limits means significantly restricted in the
ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs
in various classes as compared to the average person having
comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability to per-
form a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial
limitation in the major life activity of working. 127
The test includes factors that may be considered when determin-
ing whether an individual is substantially limited in working: (1)
the geographical area to which the individual has reasonable ac-
cess; (2) the job from which the individual has been disqualified
because of an impairment; (3) the number and types of jobs utiliz-
ing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geo-
graphical area, from which the individual is also disqualified
because of the impairment. 128 The third factor is known as the
"class of jobs" factor, because it analyzes a particular set of jobs
and skills linked to the job from which the plaintiff has been
disqualified. 29
An alternative view of the third factor considers "the number
and types of other jobs not utilizing similar training, knowledge,
skills or abilities within that geographical area, from which the indi-
vidual is also disqualified because of the impairment. ' 130 This has
123. Id. § 902.3(a).
124. Id. § 902.4(c).
125. Id. § 902.3(a).
126. Id. § 902.4(c).
127. Id. § 902.4(c)(3)(i) (emphasis added).
128. Id. § 902.4(c)(3)(ii)(A)-(C) (emphasis added).
129. Id. § 902.4(c)(3)(ii)(C).
130. Id.
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been categorized as the "broad range of jobs" requirement. 131 In
analyzing a plaintiff's burden of proof, the EEOC states that the
"number and types of jobs" requirement is not meant to demand
an onerous evidentiary showing. 132 The reference does not mean
that an individual must identify the exact number of jobs using sim-
ilar or dissimilar skills in a certain area.
For the most part, this interpretation is consistent with Con-
gress's intent to provide clear and consistent standards that would
lead to a sufficiently broad interpretation of the term "disability."
The central interpretative problem in determining the scope of the
term "work," however, is whether a court should analyze the ex-
tent to which an impaired individual is substantially limited in se-
lecting a job within the class of work with which she is familiar (the
"class of jobs" requirement), or a broader class of jobs.133
The "class of jobs" requirement fits nicely with the economic
cost-benefit rationale behind the ADA.' First, the requirement
forces the court to assess the plaintiff's training, education, and
skills within a specific class of work related to the job for which
plaintiff is disqualified. 135 For instance, if a plaintiff had a back
injury resulting from manual labor, she would have to show only
that the back injury prevented her from doing other manual labor
jobs. 136 Failing to meet this burden of proof would not force the
plaintiff to choose another profession she has neither the experi-
ence nor desire to do, simply because she can do it.137 If the plain-
tiff is capable of performing part of the class of jobs considered by
the court, it will at least be established that there are opportunities
to take jobs that she is qualified and motivated to do. In other
words, the "class of work" analysis gives plaintiffs the opportunity
to work within a legal framework that considers the jobs for which
they are most qualified. 138 Further, plaintiffs do not have to search
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., 527 U.S. 516, 523 (1999).
134. See Blanck, supra note 47, at 202-08 (discussing the economic circumstances
that led to the passage of the ADA).
135. See Murphy, 527 U.S. at 523-25.
136. See EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 106, § 902.4(c)(3)(ii)(C).
137. See Steven S. Locke, The Incredible Shrinking Protected Class: Redefining the
Scope of Disability Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 68 U. COLO. L. REV.
107, 124-25 (1997).
138. See Blanck, supra note 47, at 215-18 (inferring that a disabled individual who
works in a job that she is motivated to perform, and in which she has more experi-
ence, will perform even more "above average" than someone who is forced to take a
job she does not want to do, just for the sake of working).
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for all the jobs for which they are qualified. Rather, only a rough
estimate of the class of jobs for which she has training and experi-
ence need be provided. 139 This reduces a plaintiff's evidentiary
burden.
On the other hand, the "broad class of jobs" requirement is con-
trary to the intent of the ADA and its cost-benefit analysis. Con-
gress passed the ADA with the intention of allowing qualified and
motivated people into the workforce. This idea implies that Con-
gress not only wanted to place individuals in jobs that they could
perform, but also in jobs where the individual could utilize the best
combination of her skills and intangible qualities. 140 Under a
"broad class of jobs" analysis, an individual who spent several
years doing manual labor at a factory, a job in which she took
pride, may find herself working in a totally different profession in
which she is not experienced, but is "qualified." For instance, in
E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall,4 ' which dealt in part with the con-
struction and interpretation of sections of the Rehabilitation Act,
the District Court of Hawaii concluded:
While many jobs exist which could be classified as heavy labor,
they are relatively few when measured as a percentage of all
jobs available in the labor force. Accordingly, an impairment
that disqualifies a person from performing heavy labor would
not necessarily affect his ability to perform a vast majority of
jobs.' 42
This position detracts from the value a disabled person may offer
as an employee, and is inconsistent with Congress's economic
goals. 143 Further, proof of preclusion from a broad class of jobs
puts an onerous burden on the plaintiff-a burden the EEOC spe-
cifically rejects. 144 The plaintiff would be prevented from doing
any type of job for which she may be qualified, proving that she
cannot perform the job because of her disability.
The "broad class of jobs" test also has a particularly harmful ef-
fect upon individuals with fewer skills and less education.145 Courts
applying this test deem uneducated and unskilled workers "as 'not
139. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 106, § 902.3(b).
140. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, at 45-47 (1990).
141. 497 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Haw. 1980).
142. Id. at 1094.
143. If courts follow the "broad class of jobs" test, then a worker's talents may be
minimized if she is simply doing a job that she can do, as opposed to one that she
specializes in. This would hamper the economy's productivity.
144. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 106, § 902.4(c)(2).
145. See Locke, supra note 137, at 125.
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disabled' by associating their lack of education and skill with an
ability and willingness to perform any job. '1 4 6 When one considers
that disabled individuals are disproportionately undereducated
compared to individuals who are not disabled,14 7 the pervasive dis-
criminatory effects felt by disabled persons are inadequately reme-
died under "broad class of jobs" test.
Most importantly, as has been noted, the broad requirement that
essentially states that the plaintiff must show that she is prevented
from obtaining any employment, presents her with a "Catch-22"
situation.148 If the plaintiff meets the onerous burden of showing
that she is not qualified to perform a broad class of jobs, she is also
essentially showing that she is not a qualified individual under the
ADA.149 While the "class of jobs" test focuses on a plaintiff's abil-
ity to do a specific job in which she has experience, the "broad
range of jobs" test requires the plaintiff to show that she is not
qualified for employment purposes in general.150
Although the EEOC did not explicitly state whether it preferred
the "class of jobs" or "broad class of jobs" test,151 its language on
the issue leads to the conclusion that it prefers the "class of jobs"
analysis. The language concerning the definition of "impairments"
and of "substantial relationship" is geared toward a broad interpre-
tation of the ADA.1 52 Further, the EEOC explicitly states that
courts should be careful not to hold an ADA plaintiff to providing
an exact numerical accounting of jobs for which she is disqualified,
and that burdens of proof should not be onerous. 53
The Supreme Court's opinion in Murphy v. United Parcel Ser-
vice154 contains language favoring the "class of jobs" requirement.
In this decision, also written by Justice O'Connor, an ADA plain-
tiff's impairment was held not to have substantially limited his abil-
ity to work. 55 Justice O'Connor's language in the decision
supports the EEOC's "class of jobs" analysis:
Indeed, it is undisputed that petitioner is generally employable
as a mechanic. Petitioner has "performed mechanic jobs that
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See id. at 127.
149. See id. at 128.
150. Id. at 125-28.
151. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 106, § 902.4(c)(2).
152. See supra notes 100-133 and accompanying text.
153. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, suprd-fi'ote 106, § 902.4(c)(2).
154. 527 U.S. 516, 525 (1999).
155. Id.
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did not require DOT certification" for "over 22 years," and he
secured another job as a mechanic shortly after leaving UPS
.... Moreover, respondent presented uncontroverted evidence
that petitioner could perform jobs such as diesel mechanic, auto-
motive mechanic, gas-engine repairer and gas welding equip-
ment mechanic, all of which utilize petitioner's mechanical
skills.156
While Justice O'Connor does not explicitly cite the "class of
jobs" requirement,157 her analysis is consistent with that test. Jus-
tice O'Connor's discussion of jobs that the plaintiff could perform
is confined solely to those within his profession, a mechanic. 58
Further, within that profession, Justice O'Connor made it a point
to list types of work that the plaintiff had been able to do without
being hampered by his impairment. 59 She noted that many profes-
sions utilize the petitioner's "mechanical skills."' 160 She also noted
that the plaintiff had secured another job as a mechanic,161 pointing
directly to the "class of jobs" test. Therefore, the language of Mur-
phy and of the EEOC support a strong inference that the "class of
jobs" test should be preferred under the ADA over the "broad
class of jobs" requirement.
II. CRITICISM OF TOYOTA MOTOR MANUFACTURING IN LIGHT
OF CONGRESS'S ECONOMIC INTENT
In Toyota Motor Manufacturing, the Supreme Court interpreted
the ADA "strictly.' 1 62 This interpretation strongly deviated from
Congress's economic goals in passing the Act.163 This Part of the
Comment illustrates the flaws of the Toyota Motor Manufacturing
decision by comparing it with Congress's motivation in passing the
ADA and with the EEOC's regulatory framework. These flaws
will spur the negative economic consequences that accompany
workplace discrimination against those with disabilities that Con-
gress intended to eliminate in passing the ADA.
156. Id. at 524-25.
157. Id. at 525.
158. Id. at 524-25.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 524.
162. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197-98 (2002).
163. See supra notes 57-69 and accompanying text (discussing the various economic
problems involving disability discrimination and Congress's intent to remedy those
problems through the ADA).
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A. Justice O'Connor's Test in Toyota Motor Manufacturing
and Its Economic Consequences
In Williams v. Toyota Motor Manufacturing, the Sixth Circuit,
ruling in favor of Williams, stated that she satisfied the "substantial
limitation" test 164 because her impairments:
prevent[ed] her from doing the tasks associated with certain
types of manual assembly line jobs, manual product handling
jobs and manual building trade jobs (painting, plumbing, roof-
ing, etc.) that require the gripping of tools and repetitive work
with hands and arms extended at or above shoulder levels for
extended periods of time.165
The circuit court disregarded evidence that the plaintiff could tend
to her personal hygiene and do certain household chores because
that evidence was not necessary to show the ability to do manual
tasks associated with an assembly line job.166
The United States Supreme Court rejected the Sixth Circuit's
analysis for several reasons. According to the Court, the Sixth Cir-
cuit erroneously created a class of manual activities (assembly line
work) and then erroneously decided that because the plaintiff's im-
pairments substantially limited her from performing this class of
work, she was disabled under the ADA. 67 According to the Court,
"Sutton168 did not suggest that a class-based analysis should be ap-
plied to any major life activity other than working.' 69 The Court
also criticized the Sixth Circuit's decision by stating that there is no
support in the Act for the proposition that whether an impairment
constitutes a disability is to be answered only by analyzing the ef-
fect of the impairment in the workplace. 70 Therefore, the Court
concluded that the Sixth Circuit's analysis was inconsistent with the
ADA. 1 71
The Court's alternative "substantial limitation" test makes "the
central inquiry ... whether the claimant is unable to perform the
164. Williams v. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., 224 F.3d 840, 843 (6th Cir. 2000), rev'd &
remanded, Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 202-03.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 199-202.
168. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999). In Sutton, the Court
ruled that simply because the plaintiff could not meet the requirements as a commer-
cial airline pilot does not mean that he is restricted from performing a "class of jobs."
Id. at 493. Rather, the Court stated that he must show that he cannot perform a wider
range of work. Id. at 491-92.
169. Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 200.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 200.
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variety of tasks central to most people's daily lives."1t 72 The Court
defines "variety of tasks" to include household chores, bathing, and
brushing one's teeth because they are "of central importance to
people's daily lives. ' 173 On the other hand, "the manual tasks
unique to any particular job are not necessarily important parts of
people's lives, '"174 and while the Court did not explicitly say so,
they are impliedly not as important as household chores, bathing,
and brushing one's teeth.175
Applying this test to Williams's case, the Court noted that even
after her condition worsened, she could still brush her teeth, wash
her face, bathe, tend her flower garden, fix breakfast, do laundry,
and pick up around the house.176 Although the plaintiff's medical
conditions caused her to "avoid sweeping, to quit dancing, to occa-
sionally seek help dressing, and to reduce how often she plays with
her children, gardens, and drives long distances, 177 the Court ruled
that "these changes in her life did not amount to such severe re-
strictions in the activities that are of central importance to most
people's daily lives that they establish a manual-task disability as a
matter of law." 178
The irony of the Court's substantive test is that it expounds upon
the same problems that it sought to avoid. The Court stated that
the only time a "class" test should be used is when discussing the
major life activity of "work." '179 The test for substantial limitation
in performing "manual activities," however, is a class test as well.
Justice O'Connor set out a list of manual activities that an ADA
plaintiff is required to show she cannot do in order to qualify as
disabled.18° Just as both class of jobs tests require a plaintiff to
show that she is disqualified from a variety of jobs, Justice
O'Connor's "variety of tasks" test requires the plaintiff to prove
that she is excluded from a certain set of manual tasks.1 81
If one laments that the Sixth Circuit's "manual tasks" test is not
found in the EEOC regulations, Justice O'Connor's test will be
even more upsetting. Nowhere does the EEOC's regulatory
172. Id. at 200-01.
173. Id. at 201-02.
174. Id. at 201.
175. See id. at 201-02.
176. Id. at 202.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 200-01.
180. Id. at 201.
181. Id. at 202.
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framework provide for a "variety of tasks" test to be applied when
discussing whether one is substantially limited in performing man-
ual tasks.182 It does not, in any of its language, set up exemplary
standards that require a plaintiff to show that she is unable to per-
form household chores or brush her teeth in order to be considered
disabled under the ADA.'83 Nor does the EEOC establish a bal-
ancing test in which job-related manual work will be rated as less
important, or not considered at all, compared to activities "central
to most people's daily lives," when deciding whether an individual
is "disabled. 1 8 4
Justice O'Connor's opinion creates problems similar to those de-
lineated in her criticism of the Sixth Circuit's analysis. This leads to
the following interpretive question: assuming that the Supreme
Court and the courts of appeals run into the interpretational
problems that Justice O'Connor discusses, which analysis is most
conducive to the ADA's intent and the regulatory framework of
the EEOC? The Sixth Circuit decision, while perhaps imperfect,
comes closer to Congress's intent because it is a minor variation of
the EEOC's "class of jobs" test, and keeps the ADA plaintiff's bur-
den of proof within tasks associated with the plaintiff's job
experience.
Justice O'Connor's analysis in Toyota Motor Manufacturing goes
well beyond the intent of the ADA and the regulatory language of
the EEOC. One of the central purposes of the ADA is to diversify
the labor force, eliminate unnecessary spending on social welfare
in both the public and private sectors, and improve workplace
quality by engaging workers who have been underutilized for sev-
eral years.' 85 The key to accomplishing these purposes was to cre-
ate a comprehensive set of clear and consistent standards, intended
to eliminate trivial claims.
Further, to encourage a productive economy, the standards aim
to establish that an ADA plaintiff is actually "qualified" to do her
job if she is reasonably accommodated. The Court's analysis in
Toyota Motor Manufacturing goes well beyond this framework. It
may be inferred that the reason neither the EEOC nor Congress
created a "variety of tasks" test was to avoid placing too heavy a
burden on an ADA plaintiff.
182. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 106, § 902.4(b)(c).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, at 43-45 (1990).
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Justice O'Connor's test, in effect, places such a heavy burden on
the plaintiff that it presents the plaintiff with a "Hobson's
choice. ' 186 If Ella Williams could have proven that she could not
brush her teeth, bathe, or do household chores, she would have
been well on her way to showing that she was no longer qualified
to perform the job that she had spent a great portion of her life
doing.187 A requirement that would have forced Williams to show
that she could not perform simple mechanical motions such as
moving her hand back and forth to brush her teeth, in order to be
qualified as disabled, is detrimental to her case. Therefore, the
Court's test severely impedes the economic benefits that Congress
sought to reap when passing the ADA. It eliminates a qualified
worker like Ella Williams, who had been working with Toyota Mo-
tor Manufacturing for ten years, 88 from advancing her case to the
other requirements of the ADA-specifically, that Toyota Motor
Manufacturing could have made low-cost accommodations to allow
her to be a productive employee.' 89 Thousands of cases similar to
Williams's will suffer the same fate under Toyota Motor Manufac-
turing, a case that will undermine Congress's goals of opening the
workplace and the economy to large numbers of qualified, moti-
vated individuals. While businesses would make small financial
gains, the overall effects of a "strict" analysis under the ADA could
very well be to bring about the problems the ADA tried to prevent.
Forcing a plaintiff to show impairment outside of the work-
place, 90 while having the desirable effect of narrowing the number
of plaintiffs under the ADA, is contrary to Congress's intent in en-
acting the Act. Justice O'Connor rejected the proposition that
whether an impairment constitutes a disability is to be answered
only by analyzing the effect of the impairment in the workplace. 91
In doing so she failed to fully realize that the central intent behind
the ADA was not judicial analysis of what an ADA plaintiff can do
around the house.
Justice O'Connor also failed to realize that one of the ADA's
central goals was to allow the disabled population in the United
States to become more productive, mainly through equal opportu-
186. See Burgdorf, supra note 67, at 465.
187. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text (describing the activities in which
she was limited).
188. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 187 (2002).
189. For a discussion of the costs and benefits of providing "reasonable accommo-
dations" for disabled employees, see supra notes 86-99 and accompanying text.
190. Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 201-02.
191. Id. at 201.
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nity in the workplace. 192 Therefore, a judicial test to determine
whether a plaintiff is disabled under the ADA should focus on
what a plaintiff can do professionally, and not on speculation as to
whether she can brush her teeth or garden. Such manual tasks are
generally irrelevant to determining whether a plaintiff can do her
job to the point where she may be considered "disabled" yet "qual-
ified" to be a productive employee with "reasonable accommoda-
tion.' 1 93 The economic benefits that Congress wanted to achieve
will not be affected by whether Williams can drive long distances.
The benefits will be effected, however, by whether Williams can
use vibrating tools on an assembly line, and thus perform her job
effectively.
B. Interpretive Problems: Toyota Motor Manufacturing in
Conjunction with the ADA and EEOC
An analysis of Justice O'Connor's judicially created "manual
tasks" test is important to illustrate how that test deviates from the
economic intent behind the ADA. This Section further breaks
down the reasoning behind Justice O'Connor's "manual tasks" test
by comparing it to the language of the ADA and EEOC. Justice
O'Connor's reasoning in Toyota Motor Manufacturing conflicts
with the plain language of the ADA, its regulatory framework, and
its economic goals.
1. Deference Given to the EEOC in
Toyota Motor Manufacturing
To begin her ADA analysis, Justice O'Connor discussed the diffi-
culty of finding a source for definitions of "substantial life activity"
and "major life activity." 194 While admitting that the EEOC estab-
lished guidelines for both terms, she stated that the EEOC's per-
suasive authority has not been clearly established because no
agency has yet been given authority to issue regulations interpret-
ing the term "disability" under the ADA. 95 Justice O'Connor rea-
soned that because Congress did not explicitly give the EEOC
192. See supra notes 42-69 and accompanying text. Generally, most of the legisla-
tive history concerning the ADA focuses on the disabled individual's exclusion from
the marketplace economy, and how this affects both the economy and the lives of the
disabled population in the United States.
193. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(c)(3) (1995).
194. Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. 184, 195-96.
195. Id. at 193-94.
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authority to define the ADA's terms,196 the Court had "no occa-
sion to decide what level of deference, if any, they are due."1 97
Justice O'Connor uses strong language when discussing the level
of deference the Court should show administrative agencies. In
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Justice O'Connor quotes Congress as
stating that nothing in the ADA will require lesser standards than
those applied under Title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 "or
the regulations issued by federal agencies pursuant to such title." 198
Under the Rehabilitation Act, however, the EEOC has authority
to regulate § 504, related to employment. 199 Further, nowhere in
the legislative findings or the language of the ADA does Congress
"provide otherwise," indicating that Congress wanted the EEOC
to continue having the "force of law" in making its regulations.2 °°
In fact, because Congress borrowed much of the Rehabilitation
Act's language in constructing the ADA, 0 ' it seems logical that it
meant for the same regulatory agency that generally governs em-
ployment matters to build on its seventeen years of regulatory ex-
perience in employment and disabilities law and to regulate the
ADA with the "force of law." It is presumptuous for the Court to
conclude that Congress did not maintain the EEOC guidelines as
having the "force of law" behind the ADA without explicit lan-
guage in either its Committee reports,20 2 or the ADA.
The Court's language, which strongly implies that the EEOC's
ADA regulations should not have the "force of law," contradicts
the economic goals behind the Congressional passage of the Act.
The EEOC's regulatory framework was established to provide en-
forceable standards.20 3 Further, EEOC language does not support
a strict interpretation of the ADA, but rather sets out minimal
standards that an ADA plaintiff must satisfy in order to prevent
plaintiffs from bringing frivolous lawsuits.20 4 If the EEOC frame-
196. Id. at 194.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 194 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a)).
199. 29 U.S.C. § 701 (1999) (granting the EEOC explicit authority to establish reg-
ulations commensurate with the Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
200. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101. Nowhere in the ADA does Congress make any state-
ment saying that it wanted a change in its regulatory framework.
201. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 101-116, at 26, 31-32 (1989).
202. Id. at 44. In this report, discussing the legislative intent of the ADA in detail,
there is discussion of reliance on the Rehabilitation Act's framework when passing
the ADA. What is not discussed is eliminating the EEOC as the regulatory agency
that governs the ADA.
203. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2).
204. EEOC Compliance Manual, supra note 106, §§ 902.2-902.4 (discussing the def-
initions of "substantially limits" and "major life activity," and the broad interpretation
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work did not have the force of law, courts would be free to make
their own-inevitably conflicting-judicial tests. Without a regulatory
framework that has the force of law, future cases like Toyota Motor
Manufacturing could create judicial tests that place onerous bur-
dens on ADA plaintiffs, thereby limiting economic opportunities
available to disabled people. Therefore, Justice O'Connor's ad-
ministrative analysis of EEOC power is flawed and perhaps dan-
gerous to the ADA's goals.
2. Justice O'Connor's Interpretation of "Substantially Limits"
and "Major Life Activity"
This analysis begins by noting that in determining whether an
individual is "substantially limited," the EEOC regulations "in-
struct that the following factors should be considered: the nature
and severity of the impairment; the duration or expected duration
of the impairment; and the permanent or long-term impact, or the
expected permanent or long-term impact of or resulting from the
impairment. '20 5 Justice O'Connor stated this test and deferred to
the EEOC guideline that when deciding whether an ADA plaintiff
is disabled, courts are to concentrate on the severity and duration
of one's impairment.0 6 If the Court had weighted its analysis more
toward the severity of Williams's impairment, Toyota Motor Manu-
facturing could have been decided rather easily.20 7 Over the pre-
ceding ten years, Williams's carpal tunnel syndrome had caused
constant suffering.208 Because she continued to do simple manual
labor at work, the syndrome may have caused other physical im-
pairments. 20 9 Because Williams's impairments have lasted for a
long time, and have become increasingly severe, it seems most
likely that her impairment would fall within the "nexus of the
ADA, ' 210 and be considered a disability. Nevertheless, Justice
necessarily applied to each so as to allow conformity with the Congressional intent in
the enactment of the ADA).
205. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 196 (2002) (quoting 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)(i-iii) (2001)).
206. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 106, § 902.3.
207. For a discussion on Williams's impairments, see supra notes 1-11 and accompa-
nying text.
208. Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 188.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 188-89. Justice Breyer's dissent in Sutton states that a strict numerical
analysis of the ADA ignores many of the EEOC's specific regulations and the reme-
dial effects behind the ADA. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 513-14
(1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Working within an interpretive framework to analyze
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O'Connor chose to adopt her own judicially created test to decide
whether Williams was disabled under the Act.21'
After discussing the EEOC requirements, Justice O'Connor
made a curious statement. She said that analyzing the "substantial
limitation of major life activities" test "requires us to address an
issue about which the EEOC regulations are silent: what a plaintiff
must demonstrate to establish a substantial limitation in the spe-
cific major life activity of performing manual tasks. 12 12 Even if one
looks past the contradiction between her prior statement of the
EEOC's "substantial relationship" test, and the EEOC's newfound
"silence,"213 Justice O'Connor's claim that the EEOC's regulations
are silent would still be flawed. The EEOC's guidance on this
topic, while not specific, is adequate to form a judicial test that is
not geared toward "strictly '214 interpreting the ADA. With the ex-
ception of the term "working, ' 215 to which even the EEOC admits
a dispute exists, the EEOC intends for the other major life activi-
ties listed under the ADA to be analyzed in light of the broad and
comprehensive purposes of the ADA, with more attention placed
on the severity and duration of the disability.216 Therefore, as one
example states, "if [someone] ... experiences severe back and joint
pain... [and] as a result... often cannot walk for more than very
short distance ... he is to be considered disabled. 217
Because Justice O'Connor concluded that the EEOC was "si-
lent" on this topic, she provided her own judicial definition as to
when an impairment "substantially limits" an individual from "per-
forming manual tasks." The Court's consideration of this issue, ac-
cording to Justice O'Connor, "is guided first and foremost by the
words of the disability definition itself. '218 Justice O'Connor chose
to define the "major life activity" test by referring to Webster's Dic-
tionary and the Oxford English Dictionary.21 9
Justice O'Connor's use of Webster's Dictionary presents a prob-
lem regarding her definition of "major" in the phrase "major life
the "nexus" of the ADA and its remedial intent is more consistent with the statute's
comprehensive approach. Id.
211. See Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 200-01.
212. Id. at 196.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 197.
215. For a discussion of the major life activity test regarding "work," see supra note
133 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 130-140 and accompanying text.
217. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 106, § 902.3.
218. Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 196.
219. Id. at 196-97.
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activities." She quotes Webster's, stating that it defines "major" as
"greater in dignity, rank, importance, or interest."22 It is a "cate-
gory that includes... basic abilities ... central to daily life." '221 She
concludes that "[i]f each of the tasks included in the major life ac-
tivity of performing manual tasks does not independently qualify as
a major life activity, then together they must do So. ' 222
None of these definitional standards for "major life activity,"
based strictly on extrapolations from Webster's Dictionary, are
listed in the House Committee Reports, 2 3 the ADA,224 or the
EEOC's regulatory scheme. Justice O'Connor's judicial standard
ignores much of the legislative rationale behind the inclusion of
major life activity in the ADA. The term "major life activity" was
not an issue for Congress in passing the ADA.2 5 The phrase was
not mentioned in prior drafts of the Act. 26 In fact, when discuss-
ing "major life activity," Congress did so in the context of prevent-
ing lawsuits that fell well outside the reach of the ADA, such as
pricking one's finger.22 7 When referring to major life activity, the
EEOC states that a major life activity is to be interpreted generally
as a basic activity. 2 8 While the EEOC did not elaborate on a defi-
nition of the term "basic" (perhaps because neither the ADA nor
the EEOC intended for there to be an aggressive judicial interpre-
tation of the term), the use of the word "general" appears to mean
that the term should be interpreted loosely and without much
dispute.229
Apart from a purely definitional analysis, Justice O'Connor's use
of the term "central" has the potential to place too high an eviden-
tiary burden on the ADA plaintiff. Rather than simply concentrat-
ing more on the "substantially limit" term of the ADA, adding
undesired sub-prongs to the "major life activity" requirement (such
as for the activities to become "central" in one's life) deviates from
Congress's much less extreme intent to use "major life activity" to
discourage large numbers of frivolous law suits.
220. Id. at 197.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485 (1990).
224. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2002).
225. For a discussion on the Congressional debate concerning inclusion of the term
"major life activity" in the ADA, see supra notes 120-122 and accompanying text.
226. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 106, § 902.2.
227. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, at 35-37.
228. EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 106, § 902.3(a).
229. See id.
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Because Justice O'Connor's definitional analysis ventures well
outside the framework of the ADA and EEOC, it also deviates
from Congress's economic intent in enacting the ADA. Justice
O'Connor's definition of "major life activity" is both overbroad
and too narrow at the same time. It is broad because use of such a
general, dictionary-based definition allows courts to impute their
own subjective determinations as to what types of activities are of
great "rank" or "importance." This subjectivity will lead to incon-
sistent judicial opinions. At the same time, the definition is over
inclusive because it will allow some courts to place onerous bur-
dens of proof on plaintiffs, making them prove that they are not
capable of performing basic life activities (for instance, brushing
their teeth). All of these consequences are contrary to the ADA's
economic goals. Rather than supporting the consistent integration
of disabled individuals into the workplace, Justice O'Connor's
strict definitional analysis may instead lead to closing the market-
place to disabled individuals.
3. Justice O'Connor's "Forty-Three Million" Justification
Justice O'Connor justifies her interpretation as to when a major
life activity is substantially limited by pointing to the first section of
the ADA.230 Specifically, Congress found that "some 43,000,000
Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities. 2 31
Justice O'Connor did not quote the rest of the finding, which states
that this number will continue to increase.232 Further, the forty-
three million statistic is somewhat amorphous. Congress indicated
that this number would increase, and that a specific economic in-
tent existed behind the Act.233 Thus, the number should be viewed
as a strong indication of just how many individuals in the United
States are disabled, not as a limit constraining the scope of the term
"disability" under the Act. To cite Justice O'Connor's forty-three
million argument by itself to argue for a strict interpretation of the
ADA is to severely curtail the Act's purpose.
Even if Justice O'Connor were correct to rely on the forty-three
million person argument, her use of this statistic to decide against
the plaintiff in Toyota Motor Manufacturing is weak. Justice
O'Connor stated, "[I]f Congress intended everyone with a physical
impairment that precluded the performance of some isolated, un-
230. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002).
231. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (2002).
232. Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 197-98.
233. BURGDORF, supra note 78, at 48.
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important, or particularly difficult manual task to qualify as dis-
abled, the number of disabled Americans would surely have been
much higher. ' 234 Justice O'Connor derived this statement from her
own opinion in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. 235 In Sutton, the
Court dealt with an individual who needed corrective lenses in or-
der to be a commercial airline pilot.236 On the other hand, the
plaintiff in Toyota Motor Manufacturing was having difficulty per-
forming more mundane tasks-including lifting twenty pounds, us-
ing vibrating tools, and even performing some household and
family activities.237
Justice O'Connor's decision seems to at least partially ignore the
EEOC's interpretive guidelines positing that an individual whose
back condition prevents her from performing heavy labor would be
substantially limited in the major life activity of working because
the limitation would encompass a "class of jobs. ' 238 Although this
EEOC guideline does not directly support the plaintiff's case in
Toyota Motor Manufacturing (as it involves manual tasks), its spirit
and intent should not be substituted for an argument based on nu-
merical misconstruction. If this were allowed, the economic intent
of the ADA would be completely ignored. The idea that with an
increasing number of disabled individuals should come an increas-
ingly proportionate number of job opportunities for those who are
"qualified," would be directly altered by a static forty-three million
statistic in the Act. The result of this numerical misconstruction
would be the increase in social welfare costs that Congress sought
to avoid when it passed the ADA.
Justice O'Connor, in comparing what Williams could and could
not do because of her impairments, gave far more weight to what
she could do.239 Under this analysis, ADA plaintiffs are faced with
the onerous burden that the EEOC explicitly tried to avoid. If a
court finds that the plaintiff can perform enough tasks, it may out-
weigh what the plaintiff cannot do and disqualify the plaintiff from
234. Id.
235. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 490 (1999).
236. Id. at 475.
237. Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 188.
238. For a discussion on the class of jobs test, see EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL,
supra note 106, § 902.4(3)(i); see also 29, C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(B) (1995).
239. Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 202. For instance, Justice O'Connor did not
give much weight to the fact that Williams was unable to play with her children at
times, or that she could not garden anymore. Id. This presents a problem with Justice
O'Connor's test-what may be a major life activity in the opinion of one judge, may
not be for another. Such a subjective test may lead to erratic judicial opinions and run
afoul of Congress's intent behind the ADA.
BRINGING THE ADA BACK
coverage under the ADA. This was probably not the intent of the
EEOC, which refers to both a "class of jobs" and "broad range of
jobs" within various classes.2z"
III. CORRECTING THE EEOC's REGULATORY FRAMEWORK TO
KEEP THE ADA WITHIN THE WORKPLACE
Justice O'Connor was partially correct in stating that the EEOC
is "silent" when discussing the "substantially limit a major life ac-
tivity" test. For instance, the EEOC does not explicitly state when
one's inability to perform manual tasks is to be considered a disa-
bility, nor does it provide clear examples of the degree of visual
impairment required to be considered disabled under the ADA.241
It is relatively clear, however, that a major focus of the ADA's leg-
islative and the EEOC's regulatory framework was to concentrate
on expanding the labor force and to provide disabled individuals
with work opportunities, not on creating strict standards to render
the ADA subject to the forty-three million limitation.242
Because one of the major goals of the ADA was to allow quali-
fied disabled individuals to participate in the economy, it would be
beneficial for Congress or the EEOC to establish an even clearer
and more consistent standard that concentrates on whether an indi-
vidual's impairment substantially limits that person in work-related
activities. The first step for the EEOC would be to eliminate the
"broad class of jobs" standard.243 The "broad class of jobs" stan-
dard places an onerous standard of proof on a plaintiff and puts
her in a Catch-22 situation. It hinders placement of qualified dis-
abled individuals in the workplace by essentially stating that if they
can do any job at all, despite the lack of experience or motivation
to perform it, they will not to be considered "disabled" under the
ADA.
Further, the EEOC should not make the major life activity of
"work" the last option for an ADA plaintiff. As has been shown in
Toyota Motor Manufacturing, a court can very well formulate a
"variety of activities" test when dealing with major life activities
other than work. The result of such a test is an unclear standard of
240. 29 C.F.R. § 902.4(3)(i). The "class of jobs" test notably is different from Jus-
tice O'Connor's "manual tasks" test because the former uses objective standards that
can be based on empirical data.
241. 29 C.F.R. § 902.4.
242. Toyota Motor Mfg., 534 U.S. at 197.
243. For a discussion on the "broad class of jobs" test, see supra notes 140-150 and
accompanying text.
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proof that could lead to inconsistent results. For instance, while
the Supreme Court may consider a person's ability to brush their
teeth a major disadvantage to their ADA claims, another court
may not. From the list of several major tasks that can be listed as
"central to our daily lives," each court may consider different items
as more important than others. Even more problematic are the
differing views of judges as to the "manual tasks" they consider
important. To ask a plaintiff to make a case based on having to
predict the values of any given court is an overly strict burden con-
trary to the ADA's intent.
Utilizing the narrower "class of jobs" test to evaluate work as a
major life activity is the best option to make decisions consistent
with the goals of the ADA. As discussed, the "class of jobs" test
does not impose an onerous burden of proof on the ADA plain-
tiff.2 44 While it forces an ADA plaintiff to prove that she is dis-
qualified from performing jobs in her profession, the plaintiff does
not have to provide specific numerical evidence to prove her claim.
If the plaintiff fails this test, it means that she is capable of getting
the same type of job that she is most qualified for and is motivated
to do. The test is not unclear because it demands empirical evi-
dence from the plaintiff-specifically, the number of jobs within
her geographic area that she can perform in the area of work from
which she has been disqualified because of her disability.245 The
Supreme Court's analysis in Murphy supports this test.
In reexamining the major life activity requirement of the ADA,
Congress and the EEOC should further define the "class of jobs"
test. They should establish a more precise guide as to the geo-
graphic area in which a plaintiff can find work. This area should be
reasonable when considering first, the plaintiff's ability to get to
and from work, and second, the evidentiary burden that the plain-
tiff will need to meet in showing the number of jobs within the area
from which she is disqualified from because of her disability. Fur-
ther, the class of jobs standard should not be construed broadly.
For instance, if a plaintiff is an auto mechanic, the "class of jobs"
considered should be jobs open to an auto mechanic and include
positions for which she is qualified based on her training and expe-
rience. To ensure that the person is qualified for the jobs consid-
244. For a discussion of the evidentiary benefits of the "class of jobs" test as com-
pared to the "broad class of jobs" test, see supra notes 148-161 and accompanying
text.
245. See EEOC COMPI lANCE MANUAL, supra note 106, § 902.4(3)(ii).
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ered, the EEOC should require the plaintiff's training and past
work experience to control the "class of jobs" test.246
It may very well be that when applying this test to Ella Williams,
she may lose her case. This test, however, will give Williams the
opportunity to show whether her impairment restricts her from do-
ing the work that she has done for the past ten years. It will also
provide her with reasonable evidentiary standards. More impor-
tantly, it will not force her to delve into her personal life (her abil-
ity to play with her children) and to deal with unclear and onerous
standards. A clearer and better-defined version of the "class of
jobs" test would give Williams a fair chance under the ADA. Fur-
ther, it will sustain Congress's economic goals, whether or not Wil-
liams qualifies under the ADA. If Williams fails to show that she is
"disabled," at least we know that there are jobs in her area that she
has the experience and motivation to perform.
CONCLUSION
Congress and the EEOC should consider creating an empirical
test to determine whether an individual is "disabled" under the
ADA. This framework should focus on the plaintiff's abilities in
the workplace, because it is the development of equitable opportu-
nity in the economic marketplace that is the central intent behind
the ADA. Such a framework will ensure the doors of the market-
place will be open to disabled individuals, while fostering economic
profitability. Indeed, with minor adjustments in the ADA, we can
come one step closer to fulfilling the goals of an efficient capitalis-
tic economy.
246. See id. § 902.4(3)(i); see also supra notes 140-161 and accompanying text. The
EEOC does not specify just how important controlling factors such as training and
past work experience are in either the "class of jobs" or "broad class of jobs" test. If
the EEOC made more explicit the qualitative value of these terms, it would reduce
the evidentiary burden on an ADA plaintiff, for example, providing examples of how
training and experience may be used to assess an ADA plaintiff's limitations in find-
ing work. It may also give the employer some foresight into whether an impaired
employee is disabled under the ADA, which may reduce ADA litigation as well. See
EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 106, § 902.4(3)(i).
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